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First half of 1978 
Between reality 
and utopia 
The dialectics of the 
social sciences 
in Latin America 
Jorge Graciarena* 
If the social sciences are conditioned by 
the real circumstances in the midst of 
which they emerge, and their recent 
manifestations occur in Latin America, 
these can only be properly explained 
within the frame of reference of the 
changes which have taken place in the 
region. Specifically, certain key points 
must be raised in the context of the 
technocratic order that has come to 
dominate the fundamental institutions: 
what conceptions are currently predomi-
nant in the social sciences and why, what 
counter-ideas are brought forward to 
oppose them, and what is the probable 
evolution of each. 
Consequently, the central aim of the 
present essay is to describe the develop-
ment of a 'technocratic conception' of 
social science in the ground prepared by 
the aforesaid technocratic order, and to 
reveal its basic features. Outstanding 
among the latter are its instrumental and 
pragmatic function, subordinate to the 
technocratic order, its emphasis on the 
production of social techniques and its 
predilection for a fragmentary and sec-
toral outlook. And over against this it 
asserts the need to consolidate a 'critical 
conception' establishing sociarknowledge 
on the basis of a systematic critique of 
itself and of hard fact: a conception that 
assumes its ethical responsibilities and 
considers the freedom of the mind an 
indispensable requisite for its work, since 
otherwise there is no possibility of at-
taining either truth or objectivity. 
*Director, Social Development Division of 
CEPAL. 
I 
The development of the social sciences 
in Latin America has primarily been a 
dialectical counterpoint between ideas 
and real processes in which the former 
have adapted to the latter and vice 
versa- to produce syntheses, never con-
clusive and very often different and 
contradictory, but always rooted in an 
unceasing concern for the course of 
history, for current perplexities and 
likewise for the anxious anticipation of 
things to come. Any attempt to attribute 
a direction to the scientific work of the 
social sciences must inevitably recognize 
the existence of a recurring movement 
which has alternately brought them 
closer to and drawn them away 
-although never entirely separated 
them- from real social situations and 
critical events; so that these have been 
incorporated into the field of reflection 
and intellectual discussion in many ways 
and from a great variety of angles. The 
problems, fundamental conflicts and 
potentialities of the real social world 
have been present, in one way or anoth-
er, in the subject-matter of the social 
sciences of recent decades. The real 
history, changes and critical problems of 
Latin American societies have pari passu 
conditioned the intellectual history of 
their social sciences, although with a 
natural lag and perhaps some accidental 
breaks. The aspirations and hopes of 
each moment in history have weighed no 
less heavily. Thus reality and utopia have 
become interwoven elements in the 
specificity of the Latin American social 
sciences. 
None of this is new or original, of 
course. The conditioning of the social 
sciences by history has been demon-
strated repeatedly, especially in con-
nexion with some of their specialized 
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disciplines. Nor has there been any short-
age of broader studies stressing the 
importance of social problems in wider 
areas of cogitation in the social sciences 
over relatively long periods in the pre-
sent century.1 
The adaptation of the social sci-
ences to historical fact has not been 
merely a mechanical process of reaction, 
as might have been the case if they had 
developed by blindly following the 
course laid down by the direction of 
prevailing social events. This is not what 
has happened. On the contrary, in the 
dialectical play between thought and 
reality social ideas have had a by no 
means negligible influence on the devel-
opment of Latin American societies. In 
the last analysis, they, and more specifi-
cally their ideological projections, gave 
rise to the objectives and strategies 
which in one way or another have helped 
to shape the historical development of 
the region. 
It is perhaps in order to recall here 
that social reality does not exist per se, 
but rather manifests itself through one 
of its various possible interpretations. 
Without falling into the idealistic subjec-
tivism that denies the objective existence 
of reality and reduces it to the mere 
content of consciousness, which implies 
1
 A study which conclusively shows these 
correlations is A.E, Solari, R. Franco and J, 
Jutkowitz, Teoría acción social y desarrollo en 
América Latina, Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 1976. 
See also J. Graciarena and R. Franco, Social 
Formations and Power Structures in Latin 
América (at press in the Current Sociology 
Series of the International Association of 
Sociology), which analyses the trends in 
socio-political change and then the reflection of 
an inadmissible reductionist monism, it 
must nevertheless be pointed out that 
ultimately reality is reflected in the 
consciousness of individuals (social 
actors and/or agents), mingling with 
their ideas and interests in specific clus-
ters which constitute the bases and 
guidelines of their social behaviour. 
Strictly speaking, ideologies are precisely 
a type of concrete ideas which fuse a 
combination of social needs, socially-
conditioned judgements about reality 
and goals for action. Hence their impor-
tance in the process of development and 
social change and of course in specific 
historical situations. 
It may therefore tentatively be said 
that the Latin American social sciences 
have in one way or another followed a 
path which converges with the historical 
course of social reality. Their greater or 
lesser distance from it has in no way 
represented a profound change in their 
connexion with social reality, still less a 
break in it. This has been due not merely 
to the deliberate efforts of some of their 
practitioners —an element of some im-
portance- but also simply to the very 
nature of things, which presupposes a 
dialectical interconditioning of ideas and 
social reality. This reciprocal relationship 
is in a sense the core of the reflections 
which follow. 
that change in social thought, particularly in 
the fields of Latin American sociology and 
political science. Some of the arguments in this 
study had appeared previously in J. Graciarena, 
Formación de Postgrado en Ciencias Sociales en 
América Latina, Buenos Aires, Paidos, 1974, 
passim, and in "Las ciencias sociales, la crítica 
intelectual y el Estado tecnocrático", Revista 
Mexicana de Sociología, vol. 37, N° 1, 
January/March 1975. 
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II 
Before proceeding to other ques-
tions, it is perhaps worth recalling some 
specific aspects of the formation of 
social knowledge, particularly in relation 
to the creation of the social sciences, 
w h ich over the years modelled 
themselves on the experimental natural 
sciences. Originally, any more or less 
systematic thinking about society con-
tained elements of magic and transcen-
dental projections, and thus became a 
kind of social theology, a mixture of 
God and the world, the desirable and the 
observed, knowledge and values, whose 
particular nuances depended on the 
social position, experience, idiosyncra-
cies and feelings of its proponents. Reli-
gious prophecy is perhaps the fullest 
expression of these elements. 
At a later stage, under the influence 
of empirical rationalism and seculariza-
tion, social thought tended to become 
more worldly, turning into social philo-
sophy and subsequently social science. 
During this process social knowledge 
gradually abandoned its transcendental 
sources and references, although without 
thereby losing its teleological projections 
or its normative character. 
This transition, which gained irresist-
ible impetus in the eighteenth century 
and was largely completed in the nine-
teenth, brought two major problems to 
the fore. The first related to the possibil-
ity of isolating and separating the objec-
tive elements —or the scientific elements, 
according to the canons of positivism— 
from the subjective and doctrinal ele-
ments with which they had hitherto 
been deliberately fused, and, despite the 
process of secularization, still were com-
bined, since the study of society in the 
nineteenth century continued to blend 
judgements about reality, ideological 
projections of past and present and 
Utopian forecasts of the future. Hence 
the close links established with the social 
movements and political struggles of the 
time, particularly obvious in respect of 
both liberal and marxist thinking. 
The second problem concerned the 
new bases for the validity of social 
knowledge. According to the positivist 
model, these would essentially be the 
factual verification of theoretical propo-
sitions, and their rationality and practi-
cal efficacy. In either case what was 
called in question was not only the 
nature of earlier knowledge, but also the 
criteria of its truth, as well as its sources 
of legitimation, based on revelation and 
tradition in the more distant past, or 
more recently on reason and various 
types of social practice and experience. 
Positivist logic flatly rejected both possi-
bilities, sticking to facts as the sole 
reliable source of knowledge. 
Later developments are well-known, 
and there is no need here for more than 
brief mention of a few points of particu-
lar interest. The boom in the natural 
sciences soon made them the paradigms 
of scientific knowledge, and their meth-
odological patterns rapidly became the 
blueprint repeatedly prescribed for the 
progress of the social sciences. Since the 
earlier tradition of speculative social 
thought, sometimes transcendental, at 
other times rationalist, was never aban-
doned even in the social sciences, their 
development has followed a course 
which swings between the pole of mili-
tant commitment and deliberate ideolo-
gization, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, hermetic isolation and thematic 
asepsis aimed at preventing scientific 
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knowledge from being contaminated by 
the controversies and conflicts of the 
moment. Despite all the intellectual 
efforts made in the latter direction, the 
results have fallen short of expectations. 
It has been demonstrated over and over 
again that in the formation of social 
knowledge the confusion between ideals 
and social reality is perennial.2 This has 
been the case precisely because this 
interconnexion is deeply embedded in the 
very heart of social knowledge. 
The study of the past suggests that 
the moments of greatest intellectual 
creativeness in the social sciences oc-
curred precisely when their connexion 
with social change and historical crises 
was lucidly and consciously accepted. 
One has only to think of the obvious 
connexion which exists between various 
important historical events and the gene-
sis of some of the social sciences. 
It is perhaps worth recalling first of 
all that science, as organized knowledge, 
was the product of bourgeois society and 
of a type of rationalism which developed 
only in the urban environment. Thus 
empirical science was a result of the 
2
 The sociology of science and of knowl-
edge has repeatedly shown that this connexion 
exists. The literature on the subject is too 
extensive for references to be really needful, 
but I cannot resist the temptation of 
mentioning a brilliant critique in this tradition 
on the structural functionalism of Talcott 
Parsons: A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of 
Western Sociology, New York, Avon, 1971. 
Still more important is the critical work of the 
Frankfurt School, on which Gouldner drew 
extensively. In this connexion, see M. Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination. A History of the 
Frankfurt School and The Institute of Social 
Research 1923-1950, Boston, Little 
Brown & Co., 1973. A number of the problems 
discussed here owe much to the work of one of 
its founders: see M. Horkheimer, Critica de la 
razón instrumental, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sur, 
1969. 
social practice of urban life. In the case 
of the social sciences it is worth while to 
mention the obvious link between the 
appearance of industrial capitalism in the 
eighteenth century, and political econo-
my; between the formation of the Euro-
pean national societies based on the 
Nation-State, and political science; and 
finally, for the sake of brevity, the 
relationship between the nineteenth-
century crises in the consolidation of 
bourgeois society and the formation of 
an urban industrial proletariat, and soci-
ology. One of the most famous propo-
nents of the historicity of the social 
sciences, Karl Mannheim, defined sociol-
ogy as the science of crises, stressing that 
it not only was born of them but waxed 
with the stimuli and challenges they 
offered. 
This has also been true of the other 
social sciences, whose development has 
been strengthened and whose potential-
ities have been increased whenever they 
have had to respond to social demands 
to weather moments of crisis, in the 
form of generalized conflicts and dead-
locks which cannot be resolved by ordi-
nary means. In such circumstances there 
have often been real "scientific revolu-
tions" which have reshaped social knowl-
edge from the bottom up. One example 
is what happened as a result of the 
capitalist economic crisis of the 1930s to 
liberal economics, which was completely 
overhauled by the 'keynesian revolu-
tion'. 
The historical conditioning of the 
social sciences is assumed as a starting-
point in this paper and is on the whole 
judged to be positive. It is assumed that 
this connexion exerts a beneficial influ-
ence which enriches both social knowl-
edge and thinking on the one hand, and 
social ideologies and values on the other. 
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The fact that the connexion between 
the study of society and social reality is 
deemed to be beneficial does not mean 
that the former is invariably a good thing 
when it reflects the latter in some way, 
because knowledge can sometimes be 
alienating and repressive. At other times, 
however, access to it may open the gates 
to new social forces, thus generating 
When stressing the fundamental con-
nexion implied by the social condition-
ing of knowledge of society, it should 
not be forgotten that on many occasions 
and for the most diverse reasons there 
has been a persistent effort to free the 
social sciences from this dependence, 
either by converting them into "pure" 
sciences, which are mathematically for-
malized, abstract and unpolluted, in line 
with the scientific model of theoretical 
and experimental physics, or by ridding 
them of the infiltrated values and the 
human conditioning which have crept in 
at different stages through various chinks 
in the scientific process. 
The ideal of a neutral science is 
imperishable and has sometimes been 
invoked from social positions and intel-
lectual standpoints which were simulta-
neously deeply committed to the conti-
nuity of the prevailing hegemony. In 
such circumstances, this position was 
obviously contradictory, since the claim 
to a neutral science could not hide its 
ideological nature, placed at the service 
of maintaining the status quo. When this 
was the case, its truth became politically 
inapplicable purely because of the 
support it received from an authoritarian 
power which endorsed it. 
greater possibilities of substantial ratio-
nality among groups that are too de-
prived and downtrodden to feel anything 
but apathy towards a political and social 
life of which they are not an organic part. 
Both possibilities depend less on knowl-
edge itself than on the frames of refer-
ence conditioning it. We shall return to 
this point later. 
However, it is not only the weight of 
political factors that has influenced this 
view of social science. A by no means 
minor role has also been played by the 
totalitarian pretensions of some of its 
variants or schools to become the Social 
Science par excellence, thus excluding as 
non-scientific all the other variants 
which do not recognize it as their par-
adigm, or which do not start from the 
same premises and accept the approaches 
and problems, as well as the methodol-
ogical rules, advocated by neopositivist 
epistemology. 
The efforts of this kind have been con-
tinuous and remain unflagging. In fact, 
the need to isolate knowledge by appar-
ently freeing it from its social condi-
tioning reaches giant proportions in the 
technocratic societies.3 The reason for 
this is that in such societies knowledge, 
which is their main source of social 
legitimation, must necessarily appear to 
be independent of technocratic power. 
The admission of the existence of a 
symbiosis between knowledge and tech-
nocratic power would deal a death-blow 
3
 An explanation will be given later of 
what is meant here by a technocratic social 
order. 
Ill 
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to the latter's attempts to legitimate 
itself by means of the incontrovertible 
truth which knowledge provides and 
which it is striving to realize. 
The paradigm of a value-free social 
science has always been strong and even, 
at some stages in Latin American devel-
opment, dominant; and when predomi-
nant it imposed forms which were re-
flected in its scientific subject-matter 
and practice. This movement, although 
vigorous, was unable to dissociate itself 
completely from the social problems of 
its time, and failed to endure for more 
than a few years, much less than in the 
English-speaking world from which it 
came. 
It would be pointless to attempt to 
explain the nature of this particular 
moment in the social sciences, inter alia, 
partly because there is no shortage of 
explanations of every kind, and partly 
too for brevity's sake, because it would 
be out of place here. Suffice it to say, 
elaborating on what has already been 
remarked, that the predominance of the 
empirical social sciences, self-styled as 
scientific in the strict sense of the word, 
which sought to differentiate themselves 
from the other forms of knowledge 
precisely inasmuch as they resorted to 
empirical proof and formal demonstra-
tion as their truth criterion, is linked 
with an optimistic phase in Latin Ameri-
ca's development. Circumstances at the 
time appeared to be favourable in several 
ways: steady, self-sustained economic 
growth that ensured a flow of products 
and services, the more equitable distribu-
tion of which would pave the way for 
higher levels of social well-being and 
increasingly democratic forms of politi-
cal life. All that was called for, therefore, 
was to study reality in order to eliminate 
the obstacles and resistances which 
hindered growth from becoming true 
social development and consolidating the 
bases of consensus and well-being needed 
to achieve a more harmonious and just 
society. 
This utopia was certainly attractive 
to many, among other reasons because 
they wanted change and development 
without useless conflict. It looked then 
as though peaceful progress towards a 
fairer society could be made through 
consensus and rational methods. Stern 
reality, however, was at work under-
mining the main pillars of the utopia. 
For example, to put it briefly, growth 
and development were not converging or 
even parallel processes; planned change 
did not remove the obstacles and resis-
tances to social development, but instead 
frequently strengthened them by in-
creasing social inequality through the 
concentration of resources and income 
in very small sectors of the population; 
balanced development and harmonious 
social change turned out to be useful 
myths, whose effectiveness depended in 
any case on the indiscriminate use of 
repressive and alienating measures neces-
sary to contain or divert the reactions of 
the various social groups and sectors that 
were passed over and exploited. 
Conflict reappeared as a resource, 
perhaps the only one open to some 
desperate social groups which by this 
means alone could try to satisfy their 
social demands and needs. As a result the 
possibility of a general consensus van-
ished, as did that of 'institutionalizing 
change' by resolving conflicts on the 
basis of peaceful settlements and recon-
ciliation of interests. The clash between 
'dangerous classes' and 'threatened 
classes' once again cast a menacing 
shadow over Latin American develop-
ment. 
For scientific neutralism to be pos-
sible a number of external requirements 
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and conditions must be met. We have 
already mentioned them in passing, but 
let us recall them briefly: an advanced 
and well-consolidated degree of autono-
mous institutionalization of the social 
sciences; the formation of a professional 
community with its own means of com-
munication; a tradition of respect for 
independent academic work; an attitude 
of permissive indifference and limited 
demands on the part of the hegemonic 
order vis-a-vis the social sciences; and 
finally a predominantly conservative 
disposition, sometimes disguised by the 
apparent neutrality of its practitioners' 
aloof attitude towards the most pressing 
social problems. Their greatest open 
display of concern usually consists in 
observing the rules of the game and not 
overstepping the bounds of tolerance 
accepted by the authorities. The last 
condition is perhaps more important 
when reinforced by a professed indif-
ference towards the immediate, practical 
effects and the political impact of the 
social sciences. This means that they are 
considered useless for conjunctural pur-
poses and that social techniques derived 
from them are not desired or deliber-
ately-pursued effects, but merely chance 
by-products of the study of society. 
Consequently, it is believed that the 
social sciences lack the necessary capaci-
ty to point the way to coherent and 
viable social action, and furthermore 
that it is not desirable that they should 
have it. Unquestionably, neutralism 
seems to insist on denying them this 
possibility, i.e., that of being knowledge 
that serves as a guide, and, for that very 
reason, a source of social values and 
ideologies. 
This isolation —the ivory tower that 
many long for— is only possible, and 
then but to a limited extent, when social 
tensions are contained or repressed and 
the power struggle is not open and does 
not go beyond circumscribed and well-
defined social environments and power 
circles whose members move discreetly, 
carefully preventing their quarrels from 
rising to the surface. A situation of this 
kind can only result from the predomi-
nance of a generalized tacit consensus of 
apparent indifference towards the strug-
gle for the control of the government 
machinery and the orientation of its 
policies. It sometimes stems -most fre-
quently in fact— from a different kind of 
political apathy, namely, the apathy 
caused by the repression which crushes 
conflictual tensions either a posteriori or 
- when their public expression is stifled 
or collectively sublimated into other 
forms of alienated social expression- in 
statu nascendi. 
In one way or another, autonomous 
social participation is externally re-
pressed or psychologically inhibited. 
This narrows the margin of possibilities 
of raising the fundamental questions of 
society through rigorous intellectual crit-
icism. But such an assertion does not 
mean that criticism disappears in re-
pressive circumstances. One of two 
things may happen: either intellectual 
criticism - o n a lesser scale, it is true, 
than in more stimulating conditions-
dives into the national underground 
movement and expresses itself primarily 
abroad, thus attempting to reach a wider 
political public; or it withdraws to ob-
scure levels of the subconscious mind 
and ceases to voice itself publicly, re-
sorting instead to indirect and symbolic 
forms of expression such as literature, 
the theatre, the cinema and others. It may 
also happen that the 'thinking groups' 
which are organically embedded in the 
'Establishment' devote themselves to the 
preparation of methodologies and to 
more abstract or specialized problems 
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than the critique of society. This is a 
form of escape with less repressive con-
sequences, but it nevertheless remains 
conservative. 
Whether the fluctuating connexion 
between the social sciences and the 
course of history can be considered 
positive or negative is a question which 
depends on the position taken with 
regard to different epistemological alter-
natives and to ideological preferences 
and personal values, since, as is well 
known, a wide variety of contradictory 
ideas exist on the subject. For many, 
however, what appears to be beyond 
question today is the fact of the histori-
cal conditioning of the social sciences. 
The positivist attempts to project them 
The recent past in Latin America has 
shown that the broadest possible margins 
of intellectual liberty have existed when 
the hegemonic order has managed to 
become stable, without challenges to 
threaten it from abroad or internal 
fissures to militate against its continuity. 
When the consolidation of power has 
been followed by the conviction that 
nothing can undermine it or jeopardize 
its future, the levels of intellectual per-
missiveness and tolerance have generally 
been greatest, at least in the tradition of 
the Western societies. Indeed, academic 
liberty has simply been the obverse of 
almost uncontested power.4 But in Latin 
4
 The capitalist bourgeoisie of Victorian 
England could afford the luxury of welcoming 
the exiled Marx and offering him the facilities 
of the library of the British Museum to help 
him write the most important critique of 
bourgeois capitalist society ever known, at a 
beyond the bounds of social events and 
historical trends have sought to univer-
salize them, either by raising their ab-
stractness and generality to such a level 
that their concrete significance has prac-
tically disappeared, or else when their 
objects of knowledge have become so 
specialized and minimized that one 
cannot see the wood for the trees. In 
other words, autonomy of the social 
sciences with regard to the march of 
events has been achieved only when at 
the same time their possibilities of social 
relevance, i.e., their capacity to account 
for the direction of movement and 
change in particular societies at specific 
historical junctures, have been reduced 
to a minimum. 
America such moments have been short, 
if not almost ephemeral. 
The questioning of the social sci-
ences in Latin America reaches its lowest 
point when the trend towards specializa-
tion is strongest and also when the 
highest hopes are placed in the existence 
of an autonomous drive towards eco-
nomic and social development. This set 
of conditions largely corresponds to the 
post-war world, which aroused Utopian 
illusions that prevailed in the region until 
the late 1950s. 
The pragmatic, neopositivist view of 
the social sciences was introduced at that 
time as part of a cultural and ideological 
package which was widely welcomed. The 
package contained developmentalism as 
time when that society was successfully and 
almost effortlessly building the greatest empire 
in history. 
IV 
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an up-to-date version of the philosophy 
of progress, modernization centred 
essentially on efficiency, rationalism and 
specialized knowledge, and the doctrine 
of nation-building as a process which, 
guided and stimulated by development, 
would inevitably culminate after a 
certain time in a democratic, Western-
style Welfare State. 
This came at a moment when there 
was great faith in the future, in the 
harmonization of interests and in ideolo-
gical pluralism, all of which pointed to 
the possibility of progress towards open 
horizons from a present which was con-
sidered to pose no problems that devel-
opment could not solve. Self-sustained, 
harmonious growth would rapidly shake 
off the deadweight of a traditional past, 
while at the same time ensuring the 
attainment of higher welfare levels in the 
The concept of crisis as used in the 
present paper covers a broad spectrum 
which presupposes the existence of a 
moment in history when the weight of 
social contradictions is so overwhelming 
that it disrupts the functioning of soci-
ety and alters its structural foundations. 
The crisis thus tends to become a break 
in at least two senses. In the first place, 
something comes to an end, and some-
thing else begins. Hence a crisis is a 
moment of flexion between two differ-
ent ia te historical periods, of social 
indecision characterized by a kind of 
deadlock in which the system is unable 
to resolve the conflicts stemming from 
its contradictions. Secondly, a crisis is 
accompanied by a state of dissociation 
which involves the loss of the notion of 
entireness, whether of an institution, a 
near -and happy- future. It was con-
fidently believed that with practical 
reason planning the changes and growth 
of the economy and society, and harmo-
nizing possibilities and needs, economic 
crises and internal and external structur-
al imbalances could be overcome, 
making it possible to realize at long last 
the ideal of a society governed by 
omniscient, benevolent sages, who, with 
the help of scientific knowledge and 
technical measures, would be able to 
create a veritable golden age. With some 
nostalgia and a good deal of contrition it 
must be confessed that what appeared 
then to be undeniable truths, now, only 
a few years later, are wholly called in 
question. Little remains standing of this 
Panglossian vision so dear to an entire 
generation of Latin American social 
scientists. 
social class, a nation-State or an interna-
tional order. The social indecision this 
implies entails a fragmentation of reality 
springing primarily from the aforesaid 
dissociative nature of crises, due above 
all to the generation and accentuation of 
more and more conflictual confronta-
tions, which are exacerbated by the loss 
of identification with the meaningful 
unit in question. Overcoming the crisis 
necessarily implies some degree of re-
composition of the whole. 
Transposing all this to the field of 
the social sciences, it may be assumed 
that the disciplinary diaspora constitutes 
an essential moment in a crisis of disag-
gregation which is advancing alongside 
specialization and methodologism. The 
return to fundamental subjects and to a 
concern for relevance may also be in-
v 
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volved in the crisis, but in a different 
way, which shows signs of a positive 
reaction. Those who are moving towards 
a way out can do so only in so far as 
they are aware of its existence; once 
aware of it, they place themselves above 
and beyond the crisis itself, i.e., in a 
position which brings with it some form 
of solution. 
In more concrete terms, the present 
crisis is characterized by: (a) a progres-
sive and irreversible breakdown in the 
social and political orders of industrial 
civilization; (b) a greater confusion and 
ambiguity of objetives and values; (c) a 
considerable weakening of moral respon-
As may easily be supposed, discus-
sion of the relationship of the social 
sciences with the reality of history has 
always been controversial and has never 
reached a satisfactory or effective settle-
ment of the question. As such, it is of no 
particular interest to us here. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this relation-
ship has not been univocal or constant. 
On the contrary, upon close inspection a 
kind of swing of the pendulum may be 
seen, moving closer to or further from 
reality with the relative predominance of 
one/epistemological position after anoth-
er, according to structural trends and the 
existing combination of circumstances. 
The Utopian and ideological content of 
the social sciences has swung in a similar 
way, in accordance with the historical 
conjuncture and the tensions of social 
change. 
Let us now look at this question a 
little more closely, and distinguish two 
possible situations. When the social situa-
sibility and of spontaneous consensus, 
with the consequent increase in dissen-
sion, apathy, alienation and conscious 
social repression; (d) the predominance 
and spread of decadent, sensualist life 
styles, of which consumerism is one of 
the most tangible expressions; (e) wide-
spread questioning of the future possibi-
lity of indefinite economic growth; (f) 
and finally, dwindling confidence in the 
prevailing societal models and the 
absence of viable alternatives with which 
to replace them. What is at stake is the 
survival not of particular social orders 
but of nothing less than industrial civili-
zation and the Faustian drive which 
animates it. 
tion shows such signs of crisis as cause 
bewilderment and confusion, an appeal 
to the social sciences constitutes a direct 
connexion with the crisis itself. In such a 
case there is a growing call for an integral 
social science —if not for the total 
absorption of the more limited branches 
of social knowledge by a kind of supra-
disciplinary Olympus— to which is at-
tributed an assumed capacity for grasp-
ing all the more meaningful connexions 
of the process judged as critical. 
From this intellectual grasp of the 
situation, some hope to find ways of 
saving the status quo, while its critics 
wish to obtain revolutionary solutions 
for ending it. In either case, such calls 
are made at times when discord and 
confrontation prevail. These are general-
ly times of open conflict, although the 
dissension can sometimes be buried for a 
while when heavy repression prevents it 
from reaching the surface. Technocratic 
repression seeks to deny the existence of 
VI 
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these conflictual options and prevent 
their discussion. 
The opposite occurs in periods when 
progress appears to be self-sustaining, 
when intellectuals are neither assumed 
nor asked to be able to change the 'logic 
of history' or planners to interfere in the 
delicate balances achieved by the 'invisi-
ble hand' in the dynamics of the market. 
It is in such situations that specialization 
and fragmentary knowledge flourish, 
gaining easy recognition at a time of 
relative apathy about the importance of 
Some points remain to be made in 
order to specify more precisely the 
sources and nature of the present cur-
rents in the Latin American social sci-
ences. They essentially concern two 
problems which occupy a central posi-
tion in the internal debates and the 
dialectics of their development. At the 
risk of oversimplification, we shall pre-
sent these problems as polarizations, 
sometimes antinomical. Briefly, the first 
consists in the contrary ideals of integra-
tion -and perhaps unity— of the social 
sciences, on the one hand, and of disci-
plinary specialization on the other. The 
second, which was mentioned earlier, is 
equally persistent and important, since it 
is represented by the ideological and 
scientific tensions which stem from a 
permanent opposition between objetive 
explanation and normative predication; in 
other words, between knowledge and 
doctrine. Finally, it should not be 
forgotten that the interplay of these 
opposing elements has varied according to 
an internal dynamics which is not 
unrelated to change in social reality. The 
two have together determined the degree 
knowledge in a broader sense. Intellectu-
al work becomes more academic and 
introverted. Knowledge becomes 'priva-
tized', confining itself to an esoteric 
dialogue centred on the world of the 
professional community of social scien-
tists, who thus become the main audi-
ence and consumers of scientific produc-
tion. In such a case the academic-profes-
sional community devoted to its 'own' 
needs and occupations stands aloof, re-
mote from the tensions and struggles of 
the political arena. 
and kind of synthesis achieved by the 
social sciences at every specific point in 
time. 
Let us look briefly at the discussion 
about the never-relinquished historical 
ideal of a unified social science in con-
trast to the actual trend towards a 
disciplinary diaspora or dispersion. Al-
though it may appear to be —and to 
some extent is— paradoxical, the two 
ideals have coexisted since the very 
beginnings of the social sciences without 
its ever having been possible to reach 
either a satisfactory synthesis of social 
knowledge or else a total segregation of 
its disciplines. The coexistence of the 
two currents has been relatively peace-
ful, but nevertheless the contradiction 
implicit in the simultaneous assertion of 
both possibilities has not disappeared. 
That the potential unity of the social 
sciences continues to exert a powerful 
attraction is proved by the fact that 
every now and then the concept is 
reborn, like the Phoenix from its ashes, 
when demands are renewed for a syn-
thetic knowledge capable of grasping the 
complexities of social life as a compre-
vn 
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hensive and intelligible whole. This con-
cern has spread to the United Nations 
Organization itself, whose declaration on 
the Second Decade of the International 
Development Strategy advocates the 
adoption of a 'unified approach' for 
'integrated development', in a desire to 
deal with the social development process 
in its entirety, after the repeated failure 
of disciplinary and sectoral approaches 
to create strategies and policies leading 
to fairer and more equitable develop-
ment styles.5 
On the other hand, and as a matter 
more of fact than of principle, new 
social disciplines have continued to pro-
liferate, and once created and baptized 
they rapidly delimit their object of 
knowledge, isolating it from the hegemo-
nistic pretensions of its peers. This gives 
rise to languages which are open only to 
initiates, private methodologies which 
are increasingly sophisticated and her-
metic, and institutionalized divisions 
both on the teaching side (professorial 
chairs, departments, schools, faculties) 
and in research (centres, institutes), all 
of which serves to strengthen each disci-
pline's claim to the monopoly of its 
intellectual territory. 
For a better understanding of the 
general meaning of the movement to-
wards specialization as a partial process 
in the formation of a technocratic order, 
it is perhaps important to bear in mind 
from the start the multiform nature of 
5
 For a recent discussion of these problems 
in the Latin American context, see the 
following articles: A. Pinto, "Styles of develop-
ment in Latin America"; M. Wolfe, "Ap-
proaches to development: who is approaching 
what? "; and J. Graciarena, "Power and 
development styles", all three in the CEPAL 
Review, Santiago, Chile, United Nations publi-
cation, Sales NO; E. 76.II.G.2, first half of 
1976. 
the concept of a discipline. Few words 
are used arbitrarily. All those which 
belong to the same conceptual family 
share a core of meaning in common. In 
this case, an intellectual discipline has at 
least two complementary meanings. In 
the first place, it is a field of knowledge 
formed as an offshoot of a basic social 
science, covering an intellectual territory 
with more or less definite boundaries 
and following a body of methodological 
rules which its members claim to be 
specific to it and autonomous. In other 
words, it is an organized, limited and 
specialized field of knowledge, a branch 
of social knowledge with an object of its 
own which tends to become independent 
and thus to break away from its overall 
frame of specific reference, as well as 
from the body of objects of knowledge 
from which it sprang. 
In the other sense mentioned, which 
is by no means unrelated to the above, a 
discipline may be considered to be a 
body of knowledge with an inherent 
logic and order to which one must 
submit in order to gain access to it. 
Literally, discipline is subjection to an 
external order which a person may (but 
need not necessarily) internalize by ac-
cepting and espousing it. This is the 
more specific meaning of the idea of 
discipline in university education, where 
knowledge of any kind is organized into 
disciplines, the basic principle of classifi-
cation of knowledge in the academic 
world. In other words, the reality and 
validity of the disciplines is postulated a 
priori and almost as something to be 
accepted as a matter of principle, so that 
it is more proper to discuss their content 
than their nature. 
The discipline as specialized knowl-
edge has become the prevailing model of 
knowledge in the technocratic order. 
This has occurred less because it has 
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been imposed in authoritarian fashion 
than because it is based on a division of 
scientific labour stemming from the idea 
that general truth is neither attainable 
nor perhaps even desirable, and that the 
only legitimate and exoteric truth is 
what results from '' the fragmentation 
imposed by the very existence of the 
disciplines. 
Fragmentary knowledge is partial in 
two senses. In the first place, de facto it 
never builds up to reconstitute the whole 
of which it is part; the very proliferation 
of disciplines starts from the negation of 
this possibility. Secondly, fragmentation, 
not so much as a functional division of 
scientific labour but as a specialized 
approach to reality, is based on the 
creation of a dichotomy between fact 
and value, both of which are seen as 
independent entities. It is assumed from 
the outset that the event can be 
dissociated from its meaning (or the 
meaning imputed to it). 
This is the point at issue. Specialized, 
partial knowledge is necessarily dismem-
bered, mutilated knowledge, with res-
pect both to the general corpus of ideas 
from which it originally stemmed and to 
its own object. Carried to an extreme, it 
may come to exemplify the oft-quoted 
paradox of knowing more and more 
about less and less. To this charge it has 
repeatedly been replied that in the 
future, once the specialization of empiri-
cal knowledge has progressed sufficien-
tly, its theoretical integration will be 
brought about by joining up the 
scattered bits and pieces of its partial 
research. This effort, it must be con-
fessed, has not so far been successful; 
nor indeed, have any solutions yet been 
found for the preliminary methodologi-
cal problems of how to put the puzzle 
together. 
At all events, split-up social sciences 
which set their sights on a universe of 
knowledge that is deliberately atomized, 
which neither manage nor even seek to 
explain causally and prospectively the 
overall processes of society, and which 
are concerned to be pragmatic and 
neutral, are an instrument of the first 
importance for the functioning and 
legitimation of a technocratic order. 
There are a number of reasons for this: 
they may easily be converted into social 
techniques with a specific scope; they 
intentionally keep their distance from 
the power struggle and refuse to be a 
source of controversy and conflict; and 
finally, by making a cleavage between 
facts and their implicit value, they 
attempt to dissociate themselves from 
the social processes of the formation of 
values, ideologies and utopias. 
The connexion, therefore, between 
partial, self-limiting knowledge and 
authoritarian technocratic power can 
only work to the detriment of the 
former, i.e., by turning knowledge into 
an auxiliary of power. This was certainly 
the case in the past, and for a long time, 
but the internal conditions of the 
relationship and the type of knowledge 
involved (religious instead of secular, 
total and all-embracing instead of specia-
lized and partial) made it into something 
with a very different social significance. 
The present conditions are so different 
that any comparison of this kind with 
the past would be entirely arbitrary. 
Power of the technocratic kind, 
which is by definition monolithic and 
authoritarian, is incompatible with plu-
ralistic, open knowledge, which offers 
free options instead of authoritarian 
impositions. Hence technocratic power is 
intellectually repressive, because it needs 
an 'official' knowledge, an 'official' 
science to legitimate its policies. 
An open market of ideas and 
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informational alternatives on which to 
base action is not in keeping with a 
world of policies and strategies which 
must above all be consistent and 
exclusive in order to be efficient and 
viable. This is also why specialized social 
knowledge must adopt malgré lui a 
dogmatic stance, because only thus can 
it be at the same time a source of truth 
and of belief. Economic truth cannot be 
tempered by any other truth or judged 
by reference to a different framework 
The importance of knowledge as an 
instrument and the power it thereby 
acquires in modern societies constitute 
an extremely significant development. 
We are referring here not only to the 
technical by-products of knowledge but 
also to its critical and ideological 
projections. Its influence today is so 
great that it penetrates every pore of 
social life. Ours is a time that is under 
the government of instrumental knowl-
edge backed up by the prestige of 
science.6 The question of the relation-
ship between technical knowledge and 
domination, between pragmatic ratio-
nalism, economic organization and the 
structuring of power, is an important 
issue in reflection and discussion about 
6
 Revealed knowledge, magical and mythi-
cal, is a knowledge characterized by subordina-
tion and subjection to transcendental events 
and determinants whose nature escapes the 
control of reason; on the other hand, scientific 
and technical knowledge is a matter of 
self-assertion and sovereignty over reality, and 
it is therefore the knowledge which prevails in 
the Faustian world of industrial civilization. 
from that in which it arose. Lf it were 
pointed out that the market is really 
conditioned by institutional, social and 
political factors, the orthodox econo-
mists, those who provide sustenance for 
the 'official thinking' of the techno-
cracies, would answer that those are not 
the legitimate rules of the game. The 
market and its dynamics must be judged 
only by their own nature; anything else 
would be sociologism, politicism, or 
— why not? — ideologism. 
the technocratic trends in the world of 
today.7 
Of the various possible approaches to 
the question of the formation of this 
connexion between social knowledge 
and technocratic power, we shall give 
preference to an examination of the 
restructuring of power around the State 
and the organizations linked with it. The 
starting-point is the concentration of 
power in large bureaucratic organizations 
which tend to become increasingly 
interrelated. Let us examine very briefly 
how this process takes place in con-
nexion with the social sciences. Just as 
there has been an increasing technifica-
tion of economic production, with 
considerable changes in the scale, nature 
and integration of productive organiza-
tions and patterns of division of labour, 
in equipment and in dependence on 
7
 As indicated earlier, the idea of technoc-
racy, is interpreted in rather broad terms here. 
We shall attempt below to define more 
precisely the meaning attributed to it in this 
paper. 
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information and control as essential 
sources of co-ordination of the economic 
process, a broadly comparable process is 
occurring in the structure and functions 
of the State. The functional units of the 
old public administration of a bureau-
cratic type are undergoing a process of 
hierarchization in the course of which 
some of them gain power and relative 
autonomy, largely based on the quasi-
monopolization of rational sources of 
knowledge. Briefly speaking, the tops of 
the bureaucratic pyramids are becoming 
technocratized, which implies to some 
extent a new kind of power based on the 
predominance of technical knowledge. 
In this process of technocratization 
it is difficult to draw a distinction 
between the private and public sectors. 
The top ranks of the State administra-
tion, of the armed forces, and of the 
public and private productive enterprises 
undergo a radical change in their 
decision-making systems and in the 
scope and interdependence of the 
decisions adopted, as well as in the 
cross-linkage of their activities, personnel 
and interests. They all depend on a 
knowledge of relevant situations and on 
the timely availability of the right 
information. Power in the technocratic 
order is made up of a conglomerate of 
organizations, its bastions being the 
State, the military institutions and the 
large enterprises, particularly the trans-
national corporations. 
However, the relations between these 
entities, or between the top political 
circles and the highest technical levels 
which largely control information, are 
far from harmonious and easy. In 
general, the importance of the profes-
sional political class is declining, and 
therefore a good many of its leaders tend 
to project the image of technical experts, 
realistic and pragmatic men with practi-
cal knowledge and the capacity to 
organize and execute.8 
This trend towards the conversion of 
politics into a technical matter was 
inevitable, since so much homage is paid 
to the truth of technical knowledge, 
whose infallibility is worshipped. This is 
not to say that it is the technocrats who 
are in charge, or that they form a 'power 
corporation1. The point we are making is 
that political authority is outwardly 
taking technical forms and expressing 
itself through them, and that the people 
who exercise it define themselves as 
persons of technical competence, even 
though they do not all possess it. In such 
conditions, technical knowledge be-
comes mythified as an idée-force which 
underlies the doctrine of efficiency as a 
social ideal and rational planning as a 
basic instrument needed to achieve it. In 
politics, corporativism is the regime 
which best reflects and adapts to the 
logic of a technocratic order. 
Whatever the real situation, the 
specific nature of technocratic power 
stems from the monopoly of practical 
knowledge which it claims and largely 
manages to achieve, thus acquiring a 
great capacity to organize, manipulate 
and control, as well as to impose its 
purposes. And this has been possible 
with the help of science, which has 
thereby become a source of legitimation 
of technocracy and an instrument of its 
power. It is invoked both as a means of 
rationalizing reality and the processes 
The case is different in a regime of 
political parties in which the leaders of the 
technocratic organizations or their representa-
tives become "politicized", assuming political 
roles and playing their part in the representative 
political bodies, without thereby losing their 
status of technocrats. 
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deliberately designed to reach certain making do not strictly derive from 
planned goals, and also as a source of science. What really matters, as far as 
inputs for the definition of political instrumental rationality is concerned, is 
objectives. This latter aspect is flatly that the different components of the 
repudiated by its more orthodox practi- technocratic order's power apparatus can 
tioners, but it none the less exists, justifiably invoke it as an ultimate source 
although the real bases of decision- of legitimation. 
IX 
A complementary aspect of this 
question may be found in the course 
followed by the social sciences in the 
recent past and the significance acquired 
during that period by social knowledge 
in a historical context which has changed 
enormously. Left to their own devices, 
since hardly anybody took them seri-
ously as a source of power, the social 
sciences for a long time enjoyed 
considerable autonomy and sufficient 
liberty to develop without repressive 
restrictions. Both inside and outside 
academic walls there was an intellectual 
flowering such that the creativity and 
originality of that period has never been 
surpassed before or since. In general 
terms, it may be said that this phase of 
foundation and consolidation extended 
throughout the nineteenth century and 
came to an end with the advent of 
fascism and the technocratization of 
power in the years between the two 
world wars. During that interval the top 
circles of the fascist Establishment began 
to discover the political importance of 
knowledge and the need for an alliance 
with scientific circles. For totalitarian 
countries, an official science which not 
only nourishes but also validates their 
policies, legitimating the means and ends 
of State action, becomes an imperative. 
Their ideological monolithism also em-
braces science, and just as they have only 
one party and one official ideology, they 
develop one official science. 
Although to a lesser degree and more 
slowly, a similar process occurred in the 
democratic capitalist countries. While an 
official science was never established, 
conditions became such as to imply 
preferences, facilities, financing, differ-
ences in prestige and other subtle and 
often disguised forms of recognition and 
reward, or rejection and penalization, of 
the different scientific currents and 
schools. A process of social selection 
thus began which gives priority to 
certain problems and kinds of scientific 
work at the expense of others. 
This selectivity has been more visible 
in the social than in the natural sciences, 
both because of their immediate ideolo-
gical connexion and because they began 
to acquire particular importance in the 
policies and planned decisions of the 
technocratic world. 
These trends have continued to grow 
stronger, accompanied by the decline 
and fall of the epistemological belief that 
the desideratum of the social sciences 
was withdrawal into independent aca-
demic institutions, and a platonic, 
self-indulgent retreat into pure, abstract 
knowledge, aloof from the conflictual 
vicissitudes of social life and from the 
struggle for power. 
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The technocratization of State 
power took place on this basis. Techno-
logical reason became the foundation of 
the cult of efficiency, which in turn 
became the main criterion of validity. 
Efficiency as a doctrine depends on the 
instrumentalization of knowledge, its 
conversion into technology, so that it 
may be used as a tool to control nature 
and also society. 
When these conditions arose, the 
institutionalized neutrality of knowledge 
was no longer possible because techno-
cratic power naturally could not forgo so 
valuable a resource. Consequently, its 
development could hardly be left to the 
hazard of its own rules or of the 
enterprise and mystique of its initiates 
and practitioners. 
In other words, modern science, by 
becoming the main source of technical 
innovation and of elements for the 
formulation of ideologies and utopias, 
and by thus turning into a resource of 
major importance for the upholding of a 
technocratic order, has almost comple-
tely lost any possibility of isolating itself 
so that it could be governed by its own 
rules and adapt itself to objectives of all 
kinds. 
This problem is no longer the 
exclusive concern of epistemologists and 
philosophers, as it was when they 
wrangled over what an independent 
science was or should be like. Rather 
than this —which today seems a 
somewhat irrelevant issue—, the real 
question now is what kind of political 
option is chosen, because commitment 
to the real world is already assumed in 
the very organization of scientific work. 
Under the aegis of the technocratic 
order, the social sciences, which consti-
tute its intellectual foundations and 
provide it with the necessary technology, 
or, in other words, are an organic part of 
the order which they de facto support or 
legitimate, present a number of features 
which closely correspond to the nature 
of their structural position. Let us pause 
to examine some of the more significant: 
specialization in subject-matter is be-
coming increasingly pragmatic and ins-
trumental; the growing preference for 
quantitative methodology and the math-
ematical formulation of problems, whose 
most obvious symbols are the computer 
and information sciences, have led to 
formalistic encapsulation and a consider-
able degree of disciplinary isolation; 
their language has become private and 
hermetic, and thus untranslatable for 
non-specialist society; the impover-
ishment of their subject-matter is indi-
rectly reflected in a concern for 
methodology, which has paradoxically 
become the most important form of 
knowledge in some academic circles. In 
other words, it might be said that there 
is a sharp contrast between the critical 
fundamentalism of a past period and the 
present baroque methodologism, largely 
occupied with socially irrelevant subjects 
and the treatment of crucial problems 
without a critique of society and also 
without reference to their causes. Hence 
the recent epistemological criticism 
which repudiates all probability of 
establishing causal connexions, and in-
stead speaks only of possibilistic rela-
tions. 
There is no room, in the technocratic 
view of the social sciences, for intellectu-
al competition and debate; hence its 
persecution of critical ideas. Thus a 
dialectical process begins, with use of 
repression as a defence mechanism 
increasing while criticism grows in 
response to the repression and strives to 
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expose it. While attempting to create an 
abstract entity, in accordance with its 
conception of the social sciences, the 
technocratic order splits up and alienates 
the social scientist by considering him 
separately as a scientist, an intellectual, 
an ideologist and a citizen. Such a 
separation of man-the-scientist from his 
The traditional university has under-
gone a number of changes in its structure 
and specific and social functions which 
are related to the problems discussed 
above. In a technocratic social order the 
classic type of university is no longer 
what it was; it loses to a large extent its 
unrivalled position as the nucleus of 
secular knowledge and source of social 
rank. Consequently, the formation of 
élites moves outside the mass university, 
and even outside the whole university 
system, which has ceased to be the fount 
of socially important knowledge. Under 
the control of the technocratic appara-
tus, a whole network of new public and 
private institutions becomes responsible 
for forming the candidates for the upper 
ranks of the organizations which pro-
duce and control a major share of 
technical and scientific knowledge, while 
the universities are made responsible for 
the wholesale vocational training of the 
middle- and high-level 'human capital' 
needed for economic growth. 
At the same time as the importance 
of the university's contribution to the 
generation of new knowledge has de-
clined, its intellectual and ideological 
influence on politics and society has 
diminished considerably. Other media, 
such as highly selective and low-profile 
private or public institutions military 
scientific activity is an arbitrary act 
which assumes that the commitment to 
science -which is a social product- does 
not imply a social commitment as a 
scientist. This problem, epistemological-
ly elaborated in great detail, becomes a 
paradox when approached from the 
social angle at the present point in time. 
academies, research centres organized as 
non-profit enterprises or foundations, 
and government bodies, are now respon-
sible for the elaboration of official 
technocratic thinking, whether in 
planning the present or in forecasting the 
future. It is they that in the interests of 
the 'Establishment' define the most 
important issues and carry out its most 
confidential projects. Options for change 
are monitored and carefully weighed to 
ensure that the transformations do not 
take an undesirable course. The persons 
who are trained and act in these circles 
are examined meticulously and, when 
the results are favourable, co-opted, 
particular importance being attached to 
their loyalty to the technocratic order. 
Largely deprived of their previous 
function of training élites, the universi-
ties have been confined to positions 
beneath and generally outside the inner 
circles of technocratic power. That is 
why the student movements challenge it, 
questioning it as outsiders. This is more 
clearly evidenced in the fact that Latin 
American student revolts have grown 
increasingly frequent and violent in the 
provincial universities, where the relega-
tion and exclusion of their graduates 
from the commanding positions in 
society is more obvious. In these 
circumstances, the claims of the student 
x 
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movements are more and more charac-
teristically those of social sectors and 
classes which have to a large extent been 
cast out of the paradise in which they 
used to dwell. 
In the era of the mass university, 
only a few of them will be chosen, and 
that only once they have given sufficient 
proof of their identification with the 
system, which means denying their 
contentious past. 
The passage from one position to the 
other is unquestionably charged with 
tensions which are lived out in anticipa-
tion and which are perhaps at the root of 
the largely unprecedented conflicts cur-
rently taking place in the mass universi-
ties, now that they have ceased to be the 
natural environment for the formation 
of élites. The student conflict with the 
technocratic order has reached such a 
pitch that the confrontation has almost 
become polarized. Against the hermetic 
technocratic order the students take up 
Towards the end of the 1950s some 
authors in the United States jubilantly 
announced that we were entering upon 
the era of "the end of ideologies", 
implying that the constellations of values 
and knowledge generated by the class 
situation and class struggle had disap-
peared. Thus social knowledge would 
finally be rid of the distortions intro-
duced by ideology, and the social 
sciences would be able to fulfil comple-
tely their function as producers of 
neutral, objective knowledge; in other 
words, thenceforward their social impact 
would be technical and not ideological. 
The ideal of aseptic social sciences 
with no commitment to the world of 
ideological positions loaded with anar-
chistic, irrational elements, and launch a 
Chinese-style anti-bureaucratic cultural 
rebellion which is the natural antithesis 
of the technocratic order as the culmina-
tion of a process of rationalist bureaucra-
tization. 
In extreme cases, the protest of 
youth and of students, which overlaps to 
a great degree, takes the form of 
withdrawal from society ('drop-out'), as 
in the 'hippie' movements which reject 
the advantages of industrial civilization 
and advocate life-styles better adapted to 
nature. The attraction of the return to 
more austere life-styles in tune with the 
natural world is today a major force 
which as spread beyond the framework 
of youthful rebellion and student strug-
gles, creating strong movements of 
rejection of the present industrial, 
consumerist and predatory civilization 
closely linked with the technocratic 
order. 
man had reached its zenith. Already 
stripped of myth and revelation, knowl-
edge was now freed from its last fetter, 
ideology. The moment seemed ripe for 
raising a paean announcing the kingdom 
of God on earth. 
Henceforth, the only utopia would 
be that of technocracy. Prepared by 
experts and planned by means of reliable 
techniques, the transformation of soci-
ety and the orderly march of the world 
towards a future full of promise would 
be achieved through practical knowl-
edge, flexible compromise and agree-
ment among the parties concerned, 
together with the predominance of a 
continuing consensus based on mutual 
XI 
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understanding, and the institutionaliza-
tion of change as the master key for the 
settling of conflicts. The passage was a 
swift one from the prophetic utopias of 
the past to the scientific utopias of the 
futurologists. Suddenly, the world of the 
future could be predicted, and planning 
would ensure well-synchronized progress, 
without fluctuations or unnecessary 
conflicts, towards the universal consecra-
tion of the consumerist utopia under a 
technocratic order. 
The millenarianist ecstasy over the 
downfall of ideologies was far shorter, 
however, than many supposed and 
desired. The return to class confronta-
tion and to the politicization of social 
differences and conflicts once again 
made itself felt at many levels, both 
national and international. A series of 
university conflicts and youth move-
ments rocked the majority of the 
developed capitalist countries a few 
years later. The displacement of the 'hot' 
and 'cold' wars towards the developing 
peripheral countries, and various reac-
tions against dependence and discrimi-
natory policies, created conditions which 
encouraged the organization of blocs of 
developing countries at the regional and 
world level, converging in the formation 
of the Third World movement. In other 
cases, and along the same lines, the 
countries exporting certain commodities 
united to defend their common interests 
in the international arena. 
These claims and demands appeared 
alarming, and were accompanied by a 
growing concern about the future of the 
world. The problems which were being 
identified —some of them without 
precedent in human history— were so 
great that some people began to think 
that they could never be resolved as long 
as the central features of the present 
world persisted, i.e., a consumerist life 
style which destroys the natural environ-
ment and is based on predatory interna-
tional relations at the expense of the 
majority of the world's population and 
countries, and on the limitless growth of 
economic production, in combination 
with a population explosion which 
threatens to swamp social institutions 
and human settlements. The nature and 
scale of these problems cast doubt upon 
the possibility of solving them without 
generalized conflict, i.e., using the concil-
iatory resources of negotiation alone, 
and in the framework of the present 
stratification of the international order; 
in other words, while respecting the 
hegemonic position of the central 
countries and their right to retain their 
immense relative advantages in terms of 
standards of living and consumption of 
natural resources. 
In Latin America the social and 
intellectual climate was rather one of 
ideological confrontation, which heavily 
influenced the social sciences. From 
Cuba (1960) to Santo Domingo (1965) 
the historical parameters of social 
thought changed. An intellectual and 
political effervescence bubbled up which 
greatly influenced the new generations 
of social scientists and university mem-
bers, whose intellectual and ideological 
criticism of academic 'escapism' or the 
commitment latent in the denial of 
social conflicts became so forceful that it 
prevailed over the predominant and still 
influential currents in the conception of 
the social sciences. Different variants of 
marxism gained ground in academic 
circles, and among teachers and preach-
ers enjoyed a recognition without 
precedent in the region. 
The validity of the neo-positivist 
conception of the social sciences was 
questioned from these and other posi-
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tions. The time was one of militant 
commitment, in which the social scien-
tist could not be a mere observer but had 
to assume the role of a witness, alert and 
sensitive to the course of events, if not 
directly to become a militant using 
science as an ideological and political 
weapon, as suggested by the more 
radical. However, those who took this 
extreme position were few and of slight 
importance. The others, while believing 
that the social sciences could not stand 
aloof from the criticism of reality, held 
that their main function continued to be 
the pursuit of knowledge. But their 
conception of knowledge too had 
changed. Now that pursuit demanded 
that they should immerse themselves in 
reality and penetrate to the very core of 
its major problems and contradictions. 
Marginalism, dependence, alienation and 
class struggle were the dominant issues in 
the early days of this questioning 
movement. Others were added later: the 
State and the new forms of power, the 
techno-bureaucracies and their alliances, 
the economic domination and political 
influence of the transnational corpora-
tions, income distribution and social 
justice — problems which reflect some of 
the most important features of the 
What contribution have the Latin 
American social sciences made to the 
generation of concrete social thinking, 
i.e., realistic and viable ideologies as well 
as guiding utopias, either to ensure the 
continuity of the status quo or to 
replace it by new conceptions of social 
life? It would not be easy, or even in 
order here, to give a specific answer to 
this question, which is certainly funda-
internal composition and external rela-
tions of Latin American societies. 
Whether this choice of problems and 
analytical approaches was sound, in 
other words, whether they were fully in 
keeping with the aspirations and aims of 
those who put them forward, is a very 
important question, which however, lies 
outside the scope of the present paper. 
Besides, whatever the answer, it would 
not change the significance of the above 
remarks. What really matters here is that 
this concern did exist, i.e., that the 
overriding motivation at the time was 
the pursuit of knowledge which would 
be relevant for the transformation of 
social reality. And thus many were 
convinced that the path to the society of 
the future, to a living utopia, lay mainly 
via a different kind of social knowledge, 
felt rather than thought out, because its 
epistemological foundations and meth-
odological tools had never been clearly 
and explicitly formulated, despite some 
significant attempts to do so. Hindsight 
seems to justify the belief that this 
shortcoming did not weaken the initial 
strength of this drive, although later it 
was of some importance in cooling the 
fervour of those won over by such 
convictions. 
mental for evaluating the importance of 
the social sciences. However, there are 
signs that this contribution has not been 
lacking when different types of actors 
(groups, sectors, classes) have defined 
their aims, formulated strategies and 
chosen forms of action. Suffice it to 
recall in this connexion the influence of 
the 'CEPAL doctrine' on the course 
followed by Latin American develop-
xn 
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ment in the 1950s, and - i n a different 
direction- that of monetarist theory and 
of conservative and authoritarian politi-
cal thinking on the structuring of several 
technocratic orders from the late 1960s 
onwards, 
A more detailed review of the 
predominant subject-matter in the Latin 
American social sciences over the last 
twenty-five years could offer some 
interesting information in connexion 
with the problem dealt with in this 
paper. For the time being we can only 
make a more limited and modest survey. 
Since the 1950s the bigger, more 
frequently studied issues were undoubt-
edly those concerning national develop-
ment, i.e., in ecomomics the growth of 
production, in sociology the formation 
of modernized national societies, and in 
political science the political develop-
ment and transformations of the State. 
These comprehensive issues are tem-
porarily and causally interrelated in a 
historical sequence in which -as envis-
aged by the major theorists of the t ime-
the drive for economic growth encoun-
ters social obstacles and resistances 
which are only finally overcome when 
political development moves towards a 
democratic State. In order to avoid the 
complexities of causality, some main-
tained that at most there were tempo-
rary lags in what was nevertheless a 
consistent movement towards ultimate 
convergence in a utopia of liberal stamp 
-somewhat reminiscent of the philo-
sophy of progress- in which the growth 
of production, social justice and political 
democracy would be finally harmonized. 
These problems to which the social 
scientists of that time devoted their 
attention did not spring from their 
imagination alone but were deeply 
rooted in the reality of that period of 
history. They were very much in keeping 
with the capitalist development style 
then being put into practice, with a 
broad internal political consensus and 
the firm external support of the United 
States. 
This coincidence between scientific 
subject-matter and social reality ap-
peared to derive from the nature of 
things, so much so that many believed 
that nothing in it was incompatible with 
the canons of neo-positivism, which 
insisted on independence and neutrality 
as basic requirements of scientific 
practice. Furthermore, it was widely 
believed that this ideal was being 
fulfilled and thus that there was no 
ideological dependence between the way 
in which the social sciences were 
conceived and what they were doing, on 
the one hand, and the course of social 
and historical events, on the other. 
Towards the beginning of the 1960s, 
with the Cuban revolution and other 
events, these fashionable beliefs came 
under heavy fire in what has been called 
the 'crisis of developmentalism'. It took 
the form of criticism, very often militant 
and radical, of the prevailing model of 
development, from positions which were 
strongly influenced by marxism. This 
was accompanied by a return to a 
historicist approach9 as well as a 
rejection of the prevailing conception of 
the social sciences. The goals set instead 
9
 At this time, through different channels, 
the social sciences, primarily sociology and 
political science, turned towards history, to 
such an extent that sometimes they became 
confused with social history and political 
history. True, this trend towards historicism 
occurred without loss of concern for critical 
interpretation. Similarly, at the other extreme, 
history itself became critical and took up 
positions and problems that brought it close to 
the social sciences, which in turn influenced it 
considerably. 
BETWEEN REALITY AND UTOPIA / Jorge Graciarena 57 
were greater participation in real life and 
a commitment to the social forces which 
were generally in opposition to, if not 
actively contesting, the capitalist style of 
democracy with limited popular parti-
cipation, which was then entering upon a 
period of crisis. 
The most radical criticism tended to 
focus on two connected issues: internal 
social marginality and external depen-
dence. Its influence among the new 
generations of sociologists and political 
scientists, whether academic profes-
sionals or students, reached such truly 
impressive proportions that being 'up-to-
date' implied being able to handle its 
sources and problems with ease. Despite 
the very strong attraction they exerted, 
and the abundant and sometimes contra-
dictory literature which grew up about 
them, the fact is that neither of these 
two problems —still less the two of them 
together- ever came to be incorporated 
in a coherent body of theory. A few 
years later, some of their most dedicated 
and lucid original proponents recognized 
this limitation. 
A related concern was that of 
identifying the possible agents of change 
and modernization, on the one side, or 
the presumed agents of revolution, on 
the other. Students, peasants, the mili-
tary, workers, intellectuals, businessmen, 
politicians, the middle class and other 
groups were studied from the standpoint 
of the overriding concern for mod-
ernizing change and the revolution of 
development. The ideas of course varied, 
as did the interests at stake; but there 
was nevertheless a shared focus on 
expectations of change. This could be 
defined, from one position, as a process 
of peaceful transition towards mod-
ernization by means of planning and 
institutionalization of conflict, while 
from another position particular atten-
tion was paid to the points of break-
down and discontinuity in the prevailing 
development style and social order. 
Political instability, populist movements, 
internal colonialism and marginality, 
agrarian reform and revolts, peasant 
movements, external dependence and 
imperialism, were some of the topics 
which aroused the keenest interest.10 
More recently there has been a shift 
of emphasis towards concentration on 
the structure of political power in the 
State, techno-bureaucracies, public poli-
cy, authoritarianism, the political partici-
pation of the armed forces, repressive 
trends and the decline of political 
democracy, the transnational corpora-
tions, national economies and interna-
tional economic and political relations. 
These topics frequently appear in combi-
nation because generally they are viewed 
as fundamental elements in the national 
and international hegemonic system, and 
in the action and policies launched from 
its decision-making centres. 
Sensitivity towards the basic prob-
lems and contradictions of society has 
remained great, but now a more mature 
and responsible attitude can be seen with 
regard to the possibilities of the social 
sciences, which are no longer supposed 
to be the deus ex machina of change 
through revolution and of the advent of 
the happiest of utopias. This greater 
soundness and diminished belief in 
omnipotence are perceptible in the 
relevance of the problems considered, in 
the less chauvinistic slant in the analysis 
of intellectual models and their heuristic 
possibilities, and in the use of a greater 
variety of methodologies and sources of 
information. Horizontal links among the 
disciplines are not negligible, and there is 
10
 Cf. A.E. Solar is , al, op. cit, passim. 
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a strong awareness of the importance of central and the choice of issues and 
more comprehensive approaches to prob- problems responds, as always, to a 
lems in order to deal with meaningful variety of stimuli, including more realis-
wholes. Concern for relevance remains tic and better-substantiated diagnoses. 
XIII 
From the standpoint of the problems 
discussed in this paper, the social 
sciences may be considered to contribute 
in general to the pursuit of three 
objectives which are fundamental for 
society. The first —the most direct and 
visible— is to increase and deepen social 
knowledge; the second, to prepare social 
techniques to be used for different 
pragmatic ends; and finally -the most 
indirect, but no less important on that 
account- to assist in the definition of 
social targets and societal models, 
present and future, and, very closely 
linked to that, the formation of values 
and ideologies. Such contributions are 
made to a varying degree, according to 
historical circumstances, whether the 
social scientists like it or not, and 
although some of the effects and 
projections actually resulting are not 
included among their conscious, mani-
fest aims, or, in fact, even if pains are 
taken not to produce them. 
If the varying contribution of the 
social sciences to the different objectives 
is taken as a starting-point, and a 
meaningful connexion with the features 
and trends currently prevailing in Latin 
America is established, there appear to 
be two contrary options as to the role of 
the social sciences and their responsibili-
ties as such towards society. We shall call 
the first the technocratic and the second 
the critical option. Obviously, these are 
merely typical, schematic construís 
idealizing real trends which are never as 
clear-cut or uncompromising as is sug-
gested. To grasp the significance of these 
two options in the context of the 
present notes, they should be viewed 
primarily from the standpoint of what 
each of them emphasizes, i.e., their focus 
of attention and main functions. The 
technocratic option is characterized by 
its accent on the instrumental function, 
the critical by its concern for ques-
tioning and assessing present reality and 
future possibilities. 
The technocratic option can be 
presented through a few very broad 
questions. What kind of social science, 
what questions and issues, what sort of 
methodological approach and what re-
sults are more relevant for a technocra-
cy? Here, obviously, it is assumed from 
the outset that social knowledge is 
subordinate to the technocratic order. 
This subordination is primarily the result 
of the mimetic process undergone by the 
social sciences when they come to form 
part of the technocratic order. In other 
words, they become technocratized 
when they accept from the start 
fundamental values of the technocratic 
order and identify with them to such an 
extent as to make them an essential part 
of their own nature. Thus the social 
sciences become a highly important 
component of the technocratic Esta-
blishment. 
The technocratic conception of the 
social sciences lays emphasis on the 
production of social techniques; a great 
variety of these are needed, ranging from 
the macrosocial to the extremely specif-
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ic. Broadly speaking, their orientation is 
pragmatic and realistic, and they deal 
with practical, fragmentary, specialized 
and sectoral problems where clear-cut 
policies can be formulated and plans 
organized and implemented. Pragmatic 
knowledge is a sort of mortar for 
technocratic policies, not only because 
of the problem of how to attain their 
ends but also because of the justification 
it can furnish for their claims to 
legitimacy. The technocratic ideology is 
based on the apologia of pragmatic and 
technical knowledge, while technocratic 
power is founded on its possibilities of 
monopolizing the knowledge in ques-
tion. 
In short, the social sciences become 
an organic part of technocratic power 
and lead a peaceful, conflict-free exis-
tence so long as they toe the line, i.e., so 
long as they do not call in question the 
justice of its nature and policies. 
This is a line of development which 
can be followed without high cost or 
needless risk. However, it presents 
certain problems which should be 
mentioned, although discussion of them 
would be out of place here. The chief of 
them could be summarized as follows: 
What will happen to the social sciences 
in future if they are little more than 
organic components of the power 
apparatus and merely react to its 
demands? In such a situation, what will 
remain of the social sciences as produc-
ers of critical knowledge, perennially 
renewed and relevant, which continously 
reviews its data, discarding whatever 
does not stand up to the test of its truth 
criterion? Can the technocratic social 
sciences retain enough independence to 
surmount the barrier of the constraints 
of power when they have assimilated 
some of its essential ideological elements 
and when their foremost practicians have 
been co-opted and won over by its 
privileges and sinecures? 
In its conception of the social 
sciences the critical option stresses other 
aspects, which are by no means foreign 
to the epistemological view of science 
but which have been of less importance 
in its scientific practice. A central point 
is the conception of science as a critical 
discipline which continously revises its 
knowledge on the a priori ground that its 
truth is always temporary, historically 
conditioned, and therefore logically and 
empirically refutable. A social knowl-
edge built on the basis of unremitting 
self-criticism must by extension also be a 
knowledge arising out of the constant 
criticism of reality, which must be 
studied with reference to the great 
humanistic values that have been con-
verging, from different channels, in the 
progress of critical reason since the 
Renaissance, and in so doing have, inter 
alia, laid the foundations of modern 
science. 
Those who adopt this position view 
the critique of society not only as a 
fount of truer and deeper knowledge but 
also as a potential source of intellectual 
renewal and social orientation. In this 
view, rather than being "pure", knowl-
edge is testimony and judgement; 
whence its tendency to view society as a 
contradictory, problematic process 
which can only be revealed by subjecting 
it to objective, penetrating criticism. 
What is more, criticism of the 
present is a projection of the past, on the 
one hand, and an anticipation of the 
future, on the other. Since the criticism 
of present society involves from the very 
outset taking up a position, the relation-
ship between a critical science and 
ideological options and perceptions of 
the future is obvious - n o t that any 
particular effort is made in this case to 
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disguise it. On the contrary, although 
social science should not become con-
fused with the ideologies and utopias 
with which it is linked in this task of 
critical appraisal, an approach which 
focuses analysis on the problems of 
society is adopted both as a justified and 
desirable epistemological position and 
also as a potential means of contributing 
to the shaping of the future. Thus, 
knowledge of society as a possibility of 
overcoming its problems and contradic-
tions becomes a moral imperative. 
Once again social knowledge is 
judged according to its potential for 
relevance and for change, although in a 
direction and with a meaning quite other 
than in the case of the technocratic 
option. In the first place, the critical 
position explicitly and positively as-
sumes its responsibility for contributing 
through the critical study of society to 
the formation and transformation of 
social values, ideologies and utopias. In 
addition, the criticism of reality is 
aimed at enriching, through objective 
reason and social knowledge, the stock 
of solutions to the contradictions which 
constitute crossroads and deadlocks in 
the development of society. 
The critical position centres its 
intellectual problems on a series of basic 
questions: What is the role of the social 
sciences in the progress of society? 
Should they share in any way in the 
definition and formulation of social 
objectives? Should they be concerned 
with the materialization of ideas such as 
liberty, dignity, justice, peace, cre-
ativeness, love, solidarity and others of a 
similar nature, on which the happiness 
and development of mankind depend? 
In short, what is the responsibility of the 
social sciences towards the world of 
man? 
It has been said that the fate of the 
social sciences will depend on their 
capacity to help man in his perennial 
struggle for justice and survival. It may 
be that they lack the possibility of 
judging the soundness of values and 
'scientifically' recommending options 
and ends, but it is equally true that they 
can critically examine the validity of 
their foundations. Furthermore, every 
social science implies a social ethic. It 
may therefore be deduced that the 
different conceptions of them inevitably 
involve different social ethics, which 
imply various forms and degrees of 
relationship with and responsibility 
towards the world of man. What 
apparently cannot be demonstrated, on 
the other hand, is that there is any 
conception of the social sciences which 
does not have a social ethic. 
Contrary to the assertions of critics, 
the fundamental questions of the real 
world can be raised without going to 
extremes, either in the shape of a 
complete ideologization of knowledge, 
which turns it into a science of the 
barricades, subject to the swings of the 
political pendulum, or in that of a 
folkloric and traditionalist fallback 
which views the present merely as a 
projection of the past. Critical science is 
neither of these things. Without re-
nouncing the epistemological require-
ments of science, it consciously and 
openly accepts its social conditioning and 
responsibilities. 
The critical study of reality is 
frequently accompanied by criticism of 
the hegemonic situation, its power and 
decision-making centres and its policies: 
seldom an easy matter, particularly in 
times of crisis when the weakening of 
consensus increases the dominant order's 
sensitivity and vulnerability to criticism. 
Its reactions may vary, but generally 
BETWEEN REALITY AND UTOPIA / Jorge Graciarena 61 
speaking they tend to be openly 
repressive. In such conditions criticism 
becomes difficult but not impossible, as 
history has demonstrated over and over 
again. Fortunately, it has never been 
possible to root out criticism altogether. 
The day that happens, knowledge will 
cease to be what it has represented since 
the distant times when it was first 
secularized and then organized according 
to precise rules of method, thus 
We have come to an end, and we 
seem to be back at the beginning, once 
again posing the question of intellectual 
freedom as a requirement of social 
knowledge and, in general, of scientific 
truth. No final conclusions can be 
drawn, however, from a few thoughts 
such as these, which have been put 
forward for the sole purpose of sket-
ching a very general historical outline of 
the problems of the relationship between 
knowledge and social reality, and of the 
meaning acquired by the conceptions of 
intellectual responsibility and autonomy 
in some of their varying frameworks in 
Latin America's past and present. 
The above remarks may perhaps 
serve to suggest that the discussion about 
the neutrality of the social sciences has 
been couched in terms which might now 
be considered out of date. The viability 
of free knowledge nurtured in an 
independent academic world is some-
thing which today may be recalled with 
nostalgia and even advocated as an ideal, 
but which can hardly be reconciled with 
the possibilities of the world around us. 
The autonomy and freedom of 
knowledge are problems which will 
acquiring the characteristic of scientific 
knowledge, i.e., critical knowledge. In 
the course of history, secular scientific 
knowledge has travelled through much 
difficult territory, and has managed to 
survive despite all obstacles. It has done 
so precisely because it has never lost its 
capacity to renew itself under the 
purging influence of self-criticism and by 
watchful, independent observation of 
reality. 
always be a matter of concern and 
discussion in the social sciences, al-
though their specific referents and their 
meaning will vary with the changes in 
the real world. Since there is no way of 
conceiving social knowledge without at 
the same time posing the problems of 
its objectivity and relevance -and hence 
inevitably the question of intellectual 
freedom, without which there can be 
neither truth nor objectivity— perhaps 
the most important issue is to determine 
what specific forms are assumed by 
those relationships in concrete historical-
social contexts. To do so is to assert the 
relativity of scientific truth in the social 
sciences, and hence the constant need of 
re-examining the problems concerned in 
the light of the changes in the historical 
situation. 
Neither wholly dependent nor un-
conditionally autonomous, social knowl-
edge evolves in historically variable 
circumstances and conditions which 
shape it; but it does not thereby lose all 
its possibilities of relative independence, 
which it can retain in the face of all 
constraints, only so long as it does not 
renounce its critical calling. 
XIV 
